> For the complete documentation index, see [llms.txt](https://docs.concurrence.com/llms.txt). Markdown versions of documentation pages are available by appending `.md` to page URLs; this page is available as [Markdown](https://docs.concurrence.com/api-reference/change-logs/api-history/amigo-api-history-03.md).

# Concurrence API: Archive 3

Retained API history, archive 3, with original entry headings and links back to current integration guidance.

This archive includes authorization and intake sources. Entries retain their original release context and do not establish current availability. Use [Current Upgrade Guidance](https://docs.concurrence.com/api-reference/change-logs/upgrade-guide.md) before applying an older example.

[Previous archive](https://docs.concurrence.com/api-reference/change-logs/api-history/amigo-api-history-02.md) · [Archive index](https://docs.concurrence.com/api-reference/change-logs/amigo-api.md#archive-index) · [Next archive](https://docs.concurrence.com/api-reference/change-logs/api-history/amigo-api-history-04.md)

<details>

<summary>Platform API: Voice Turn Accept Header Content Negotiation (July 2026)</summary>

#### Voice Turn Accept Header Content Negotiation <a href="#voice-turn-accept-header-content-negotiation" id="voice-turn-accept-header-content-negotiation"></a>

The voice-turn endpoint now supports content negotiation via the `Accept` header, allowing callers to receive the agent's spoken reply as WAV PCM16 instead of the default OGG Opus.

**What changed:**

* **WAV output format.** Callers can set the `Accept` header to `audio/wav` to receive the agent's spoken reply as a WAV PCM16 file (16 kHz, mono, 16-bit). This is useful for mobile clients that cannot natively decode OGG Opus - for example, iOS AVPlayer.
* **Content negotiation.** The endpoint compares the q-values of `audio/wav` and `audio/ogg` in the request's `Accept` header. If `audio/wav` has a higher q-value, the response is WAV. Otherwise, the response remains OGG Opus. Missing, wildcard, or unrecognized `Accept` values default to OGG Opus, so existing callers are unaffected.
* **Response Content-Type.** The response `Content-Type` header reflects the negotiated format: `audio/ogg` or `audio/wav`.
* **204 and error responses unchanged.** Silence (204) and error responses behave the same regardless of the requested format.

**What you need to do:**

* **No action required for existing integrations.** The default output format remains OGG Opus. Existing callers that do not send an `Accept` header continue to work without changes.
* **Send `Accept: audio/wav` for WAV output.** If your client needs WAV PCM16 (for example, for native iOS playback), include `Accept: audio/wav` in the voice-turn request.

</details>

<details>

<summary>Platform: Simulation Step Timeout Increased (July 2026)</summary>

#### Simulation Step Timeout Increased <a href="#simulation-step-timeout-increased" id="simulation-step-timeout-increased"></a>

The timeout for individual simulation steps has been increased to accommodate slow tool execution during simulated conversations.

**What changed:**

* **Longer simulation step budget.** The platform now allows more time for each simulation turn to complete. Simulations that exercise warehouse-backed tools or other data-heavy tool calls are less likely to be cancelled prematurely before the agent produces a transcript.
* **Bridge timeout aligned.** The internal coordination timeout between simulation components has been raised above the per-step budget, ensuring that a slow tool turn can finish and return its structured result rather than being interrupted by an earlier layer.

**What you need to do:**

* **No action required.** Simulations that previously timed out on data-heavy first turns should now complete normally. There are no API or configuration changes.

</details>

<details>

<summary>Platform API: Workspace Provision Endpoint Reschedules Scope Provisioner (July 2026)</summary>

#### Workspace Provision Endpoint Reschedules Scope Provisioner <a href="#workspace-provision-endpoint-reschedules-scope-provisioner" id="workspace-provision-endpoint-reschedules-scope-provisioner"></a>

The workspace provision endpoint now reschedules the workspace-scope data provisioner in addition to marking the workspace as provisioned.

**What changed:**

* **Scope provisioner rescheduled on provision.** Calling the provision endpoint now triggers the workspace-scope data provisioner on a best-effort basis. Previously, the scope provisioner ran only during workspace creation, so workspaces created before eager provisioning was available - or workspaces whose initial scope trigger was missed - had no self-serve way to backfill the serving layer.
* **Idempotent and safe to repeat.** The scope provisioner is idempotent. Operators can call the provision endpoint again on existing or partially-provisioned workspaces to backfill scope without risk of duplication or side effects.
* **Best-effort, non-blocking.** The scope provisioner runs asynchronously and does not delay the provision response or surface errors into it. The endpoint continues to return the same response shape as before.

**What you need to do:**

* **No action required for new workspaces.** New workspaces provisioned through the standard flow are unaffected.
* **Re-provision to backfill.** If you have workspaces that were created before eager provisioning or that appear to be missing their serving layer, call the provision endpoint again to trigger the scope provisioner.

</details>

<details>

<summary>Platform: World Model Workspace-Scoped Entity Projection (July 2026)</summary>

#### World Model Workspace-Scoped Entity Projection <a href="#world-model-workspace-scoped-entity-projection" id="world-model-workspace-scoped-entity-projection"></a>

Entity projection now enforces full workspace isolation at every stage, preventing cross-workspace data leakage when the same entity identifier exists in more than one workspace.

**What changed:**

* **Workspace-scoped projection.** Entity snapshot materialization now keys every stage - dirty-entity tracking, event scoping, enrichment overlay, and snapshot writes - on the combination of workspace and entity identifier rather than entity identifier alone. Previously, if the same entity identifier appeared in two workspaces, a change in one workspace could pull in the other workspace's events and enrichment data, producing incorrect snapshots or failing the write operation.
* **Isolated deletes.** When an entity's events are fully removed, the cleanup targets only that entity within its own workspace. Entities with the same identifier in other workspaces are unaffected.
* **Applies to all projection feeds.** The fix covers event-change, enrichment-change, and reconciliation feeds that drive entity materialization.

**What you need to do:**

* **No action required.** This is a correctness fix. Workspaces that share entity identifiers will now project independently. If you previously observed unexpected data in entity projections for multi-workspace deployments, those issues should no longer occur.

</details>

<details>

<summary>Platform: Scheduled Workspace Topic Classification (July 2026)</summary>

#### Scheduled Workspace Topic Classification <a href="#scheduled-workspace-topic-classification" id="scheduled-workspace-topic-classification"></a>

Conversation topic classification can now run on a recurring schedule across all enabled workspaces, without manual triggering.

**What changed:**

* **Automatic workspace discovery.** The platform periodically discovers workspaces that have the durable topic-modeling setting enabled, resolves each workspace's active taxonomy and service-derived domain context, and classifies recent conversations against the taxonomy.
* **Per-workspace isolation.** Each enabled workspace is evaluated independently. A workspace that is enabled but misconfigured - for example, missing an active taxonomy or lacking an active service with a non-blank name - is quarantined with a recorded reason rather than blocking classification for every other tenant.
* **Quarantine visibility.** Skipped workspaces and their skip reasons are persisted for operational triage, so misconfigurations surface rather than disappearing silently.
* **Rate limit adjustment.** The per-workspace daily classification call limit has been lowered from 20,000 to 2,000 to align with scheduled execution cadence.

**What you need to do:**

* **Enable topic modeling in workspace settings.** Workspaces with the topic-modeling setting enabled and a single active taxonomy plus at least one active service will be classified automatically.
* **Review skipped workspace reports.** If a workspace is enabled but does not appear in classification results, check the quarantine records for the skip reason and correct the configuration.

</details>

<details>

<summary>Platform: World Model Pipeline Event Log (July 2026)</summary>

#### World Model Pipeline Event Log <a href="#world-model-pipeline-event-log" id="world-model-pipeline-event-log"></a>

World-model pipeline runs now publish event logs to a queryable table, giving operators visibility into processing activity.

**What changed:**

* **Pipeline event log.** World-model data pipelines now emit structured event logs that are queryable through the platform's analytics layer. This supports operational monitoring, debugging, and triage of pipeline behavior.

**What you need to do:**

* **No action required.** Pipeline event logs are published automatically. Use the queryable event log for operational visibility into world-model processing.

</details>

<details>

<summary>Platform API: Authorization-Bound Test Values in Simulations (July 2026)</summary>

#### Authorization-Bound Test Values in Simulations <a href="#authorization-bound-test-values-in-simulations" id="authorization-bound-test-values-in-simulations"></a>

Simulations can now exercise SQL tools that depend on authorization-bound parameters using their configured per-parameter test values.

**What changed:**

* **Authorization-scoped test values enabled.** Simulation sessions, bridge runs, and benchmark cases now propagate an authorization-binding test-value flag alongside the existing identity-binding flag. When the launching workspace actor holds the data-query permission, authorization-bound SQL tool parameters may use their configured playground test values during the simulation.
* **Permission gating.** The flag is server-derived from the launching actor's role - it is not caller-controlled. The required permission is the same grant that the text playground uses for data queries, ensuring consistent access control between interactive testing and automated simulations.
* **Applies across simulation types.** The capability works for single simulation sessions, bridge runs (sync and async), individual case runs, and full benchmark suites.

**What you need to do:**

* **No action required for most users.** If your workspace actor already has data-query permission and your SQL tools have configured test values, simulations will use them automatically.
* **Review SQL tool test values.** If you have not configured per-parameter test values for authorization-bound SQL tool parameters, simulations will continue to behave as before. Add test values through the tool configuration to take advantage of this capability.

</details>

<details>

<summary>Platform API: SQL Authorization Binding Test Values for Platform Functions and Workspace Data Queries (July 2026)</summary>

#### SQL Authorization Binding Test Values for Platform Functions and Workspace Data Queries <a href="#sql-authorization-binding-test-values-for-platform-functions-and-workspace-data-queries" id="sql-authorization-binding-test-values-for-platform-functions-and-workspace-data-queries"></a>

Server-bound SQL tool parameters can now carry an optional test fallback value. When a workspace operator tests a bound function or data query from the Developer Console playground or the function-test panel, the platform uses the configured test value instead of requiring a live external-user authorization context.

**What changed:**

* **Test value on bound parameters.** Platform Function and Workspace Data Query parameters that declare an authorization binding can now include an optional test value. The value is a comma-separated list of resource keys that the platform normalizes (sorted, deduplicated, whitespace-trimmed) at authoring time.
* **Trusted playground and function-test execution.** When a workspace member with data-query permission runs a bound tool from the playground or the function-test panel, the platform substitutes the configured test value for the bound parameter. Live external-user authorization always takes precedence when present. External-user turns, voice calls, and direct API invocations are unaffected.
* **Observability.** Each test-value substitution emits a structured log entry and a metric increment identifying the workspace, tool, parameter, and binding without exposing the configured value itself.
* **Validation rules.** A test value requires an authorization binding on the same parameter. Empty strings are rejected. Resource keys must match the lowercase alphanumeric-plus-underscore pattern, and the total length is capped. These rules are enforced at create and update time for both Platform Functions and Workspace Data Queries.
* **Create and update endpoints.** The Platform Function create endpoint and the Workspace Data Query create and update endpoints accept the new field on each parameter. The field is optional and defaults to absent.

**What you need to do:**

* **No action required for production workloads.** Live authorization resolution is unchanged. The test value is inert unless the server explicitly enables it for a trusted invocation.
* **To use test values,** add the field to any authorization-bound parameter when creating or updating a Platform Function or Workspace Data Query. Then test the tool from the Developer Console playground or function-test panel.

</details>

<details>

<summary>Platform API: Run-Scoped Token Caching for Integration Calls (July 2026)</summary>

#### Run-Scoped Token Caching for Integration Calls <a href="#run-scoped-token-caching-for-integration-calls" id="run-scoped-token-caching-for-integration-calls"></a>

Integration tool calls within an orchestrated skill run now reuse minted bearer tokens instead of re-minting on every call. This reduces latency and external token-endpoint load when a single agent turn fans out to many downstream API calls against the same integration.

**What changed:**

* **Run-scoped bearer reuse.** When an orchestrated skill run makes multiple calls to the same integration, the platform now mints the downstream bearer token once and reuses it for subsequent calls within that run. Previously, every integration call minted a fresh token even when the credentials and scopes were identical.
* **Scope and lifetime.** The cached token is scoped to a single skill run. It is never shared across runs, conversations, or services. The cache is discarded when the run completes, fails, or times out.
* **Expiry-aware.** Cached tokens respect the token lifetime reported by the downstream token endpoint. Tokens nearing expiry are treated as expired and re-minted automatically. A conservative safety margin prevents a cached token from being replayed into a call that could outlive the token's validity. Long-lived tokens are clamped to a shorter reuse window regardless of the reported lifetime.
* **Automatic invalidation on authentication failure.** If a downstream system rejects a cached token with an authentication error (HTTP 401), the cached entry is evicted immediately and the next call in the run mints a fresh token. Authorization failures (HTTP 403) do not evict the cache, since they indicate a permissions issue rather than a bad token.
* **At-rest protection.** Cached tokens are encrypted in memory using a per-run encryption key that is never persisted. This provides defense-in-depth against accidental exposure of bearer values in process diagnostics.
* **Supported auth types.** Caching applies to OAuth 2.0 Client Credentials, OAuth 2.0 JWT Bearer, and static-configuration custom token exchanges. Token exchanges that incorporate per-request values - such as identity bindings or caller-supplied parameters routed into the exchange - are never cached, because the minted token varies by request. Static header authentication is a secret read, not a token mint, and is unaffected.
* **No change for non-orchestrated paths.** Direct tool calls, voice direct tools, triggers, and atomic tool runners continue to mint a fresh token on every call. The caching optimization applies only to orchestrated skill runs.

**What you need to do:**

* **No action required.** This is a transparent performance improvement. Integration authentication contracts, API request and response shapes, and tool behavior are unchanged. Downstream systems see the same valid bearer tokens as before, with fewer token-endpoint calls under fan-out workloads.

</details>

<details>

<summary>Platform API: Emotion Detection Now Requires GPU and Runs in Half-Precision (July 2026)</summary>

#### Emotion Detection Now Requires GPU and Runs in Half-Precision <a href="#emotion-detection-now-requires-gpu-and-runs-in-half-precision" id="emotion-detection-now-requires-gpu-and-runs-in-half-precision"></a>

The emotion detection pipeline now requires GPU compute and loads model weights in half-precision, reducing memory consumption and removing transient memory spikes during inference.

**What changed:**

* **GPU required.** Emotion detection no longer falls back to CPU execution. Environments without GPU availability cannot run the emotion detection pipeline. Previously, the service attempted CPU inference when no GPU was present.
* **Half-precision model weights.** Both emotion classification models now load their weights in half-precision. This approximately halves the resident GPU memory required by the model pair and eliminates a transient memory spike that occurred on each inference call when weights were converted on the fly. Emotion classification scores and dimensional outputs remain materially identical to the previous full-precision behavior.

**What you need to do:**

* **Verify GPU availability.** If your deployment runs emotion detection, confirm that GPU compute is available in the target environment. CPU-only deployments will no longer start the emotion detection service successfully.
* **No API or integration changes required.** Emotion detection request and response contracts are unchanged. Score outputs are not meaningfully affected.

</details>

<details>

<summary>Platform API: Intake Source Secret Namespace Change (July 2026)</summary>

#### Intake Source Secret Namespace Change <a href="#intake-source-secret-namespace-change" id="intake-source-secret-namespace-change"></a>

Intake source credentials are now stored in a dedicated per-source secret namespace, separate from the namespace used by general connectors.

**What changed:**

* **Dedicated secret namespace for intake sources.** Service-account keys provisioned for intake sources now use an intake-source-specific secret path rather than sharing the general connector secret namespace. The path is derived deterministically from the source identifier, so renaming a source does not orphan its provisioned credential.
* **Direct secret resolution.** Credential retrieval at sync time reads the secret directly from the parameter store instead of routing through the shared connector secret resolver. If the credential has not been provisioned, the sync returns an unprocessable-entity error with a message instructing the operator to upload the service-account key first.
* **No change to the registration API contract.** The request and response shapes for registering an intake source are unchanged. The secret path is still derived server-side and is never accepted from clients.

**What you need to do:**

* **Provision new intake source credentials in the updated namespace.** If you are setting up a new intake source, place the service-account key in the intake-source secret path provided by your platform administrator. Existing sources whose credentials were already provisioned in the previous namespace should be migrated in coordination with your platform operations team.
* **No client-side code changes required.** The API request and response contracts are unchanged.

</details>

<details>

<summary>Platform API: Mesh-Only Certificate Authentication for Internal Service Tokens (July 2026)</summary>

#### Mesh-Only Certificate Authentication for Internal Service Tokens <a href="#mesh-only-certificate-authentication-for-internal-service-tokens" id="mesh-only-certificate-authentication-for-internal-service-tokens"></a>

Internal platform services that mint agent-session tokens now authenticate exclusively through mesh-verified certificate identity. Client secrets are no longer sent or required for these callers.

**What changed:**

* **Secret-free authentication for internal callers.** Internal platform services that request agent-session tokens now rely entirely on their mesh-verified certificate identity (RFC 8705 `tls_client_auth`). The token request carries only the grant type and the caller's identity - no client secret is included. The mesh infrastructure verifies the caller's certificate at the transport layer before the request reaches the identity service.
* **Caller identity derived from deployment context.** The caller's identity is constructed from its deployment namespace and service account, provided through standard deployment metadata. This replaces the previous model where a separately provisioned secret was required.
* **One authentication method per credential.** Each credential uses either certificate-based authentication or a client secret - never both. Credentials registered for certificate authentication are provisioned without a client secret. A `client_secret` sent alongside a certificate-authenticated credential is ignored.
* **`client_id` always required.** The token request always requires `client_id` regardless of authentication method. The platform does not derive client identity from the certificate alone.
* **Service-account credentials only.** Certificate-based authentication is restricted to service-account principal types. Provider and external integration credentials continue to require client secrets.
* **No lockout on certificate failures.** Failed certificate authentication does not increment lockout counters because the certificate subject is transport-verified and cannot be brute-forced.
* **Audit trail.** Successful token grants via certificate authentication include `auth_method` in the audit event metadata. Failed certificate authentication attempts are logged with a distinct reason.
* **Existing secret-based flows unchanged.** Credentials without a certificate registration continue to require `client_secret` as before.

**What you need to do:**

* **No action required for existing integrations.** Secret-based `client_credentials` grants continue to work without changes. External OAuth2 clients and provider credentials are not affected.
* **Internal service teams** provisioning new mesh-authenticated credentials should coordinate with platform administration for certificate subject registration.

</details>

<details>

<summary>Platform API: Mutual TLS Client Authentication for Service Credentials (July 2026)</summary>

#### Mutual TLS Client Authentication for Service Credentials <a href="#mutual-tls-client-authentication-for-service-credentials" id="mutual-tls-client-authentication-for-service-credentials"></a>

The `client_credentials` grant now supports certificate-based authentication as an alternative to client secrets for internal service credentials.

**What changed:**

* **Certificate-based authentication method.** Service credentials can now be registered with a certificate subject instead of a client secret. When a credential has a certificate registration, the platform authenticates the client by verifying the certificate subject presented by the service mesh against the registered expected subject. The verified subject must match exactly.
* **One authentication method per credential.** Each credential uses either certificate-based authentication or a client secret - never both. Credentials registered for certificate authentication are provisioned without a client secret. A `client_secret` sent alongside a certificate-authenticated credential is ignored.
* **`client_id` always required.** The token request always requires `client_id` regardless of authentication method. The platform does not derive client identity from the certificate alone.
* **Service-account credentials only.** Certificate-based authentication is restricted to service-account principal types. Provider and external integration credentials continue to require client secrets. A certificate-authenticated request for a non-service-account credential returns `invalid_client`.
* **No lockout on certificate failures.** Failed certificate authentication does not increment lockout counters because the certificate subject is transport-verified and cannot be brute-forced. This prevents a misconfigured caller from locking out the legitimate service.
* **Audit trail.** Successful token grants via certificate authentication include `auth_method` in the audit event metadata. Failed certificate authentication attempts are logged with a distinct reason.
* **Existing secret-based flows unchanged.** Credentials without a certificate registration continue to require `client_secret` as before. The error message for a missing `client_secret` on those credentials is unchanged.

**What you need to do:**

* **No action required for existing integrations.** Secret-based `client_credentials` grants continue to work without changes.
* **Internal service teams** provisioning new mesh-authenticated credentials should coordinate with platform administration for certificate subject registration.

</details>

<details>

<summary>Platform API: Async Audit Exports and Export Catalog Removal (July 2026)</summary>

#### Async Audit Exports and Export Catalog Removal <a href="#async-audit-exports-and-export-catalog-removal" id="async-audit-exports-and-export-catalog-removal"></a>

Audit exports now run asynchronously and return short-lived download links instead of writing persistent artifacts to a workspace volume.

**What changed:**

* **Async export submission.** `POST /v1/{workspace_id}/audit/exports` now returns a statement handle (`statement_id`) instead of a completed export. The export runs asynchronously.
* **Export polling endpoint.** `GET /v1/{workspace_id}/audit/exports/{statement_id}` returns the current status of a submitted export. While the export is running, the status is `pending`. Once complete, the status is `ready` and the response includes presigned download chunks with row counts and byte sizes. The presigned links are short-lived.
* **Export listing removed.** The endpoint that listed persistent export artifacts in the workspace audit volume has been removed. Exports are ephemeral - download the results when the export finishes.
* **Export format.** Results are returned as downloadable files (CSV) rather than NDJSON artifacts stored in a volume. Large exports may be split across multiple download chunks.

**What you need to do:**

* **Adopt the submit-poll-download pattern.** After submitting an export, poll the statement endpoint until the status is `ready`, then download the files from the presigned links before they expire.
* **Remove any code that lists past exports.** The persistent export catalog no longer exists.
* **Update expected export format.** Exports now produce CSV files rather than NDJSON.

</details>

<details>

<summary>Platform API: Cross-Workspace Audit Log Reads (July 2026)</summary>

#### Cross-Workspace Audit Log Reads <a href="#cross-workspace-audit-log-reads" id="cross-workspace-audit-log-reads"></a>

Two new audit log read endpoints allow callers to query audit events outside the scope of a single workspace.

**What changed:**

* **Personal audit trail endpoint.** `GET /v1/audit-log/me` returns the authenticated caller's own audit events across every workspace. The actor is server-set from the credential - callers cannot query another user's trail. Any authenticated credential bound to an actor entity may call this endpoint; no additional permission is required.
* **Platform-wide audit read endpoint.** `GET /v1/audit-log/platform` returns audit events across all workspaces, including events that carry no workspace (such as login events emitted before workspace activation). This endpoint requires the `platform:admin` scope. Optional query filters include `workspace_id`, `service`, `action`, `actor_entity_id`, `resource_type`, `resource_id`, `phi_only`, `date_from`, `date_to`, `limit`, and `offset`.
* **Nullable workspace on audit events.** The `workspace_id` field in audit event responses is now nullable. Workspace-scoped reads always populate it, but the platform-wide read may return events with a null workspace for pre-workspace events such as login or credential-theft detection.
* **Existing workspace-scoped audit read unchanged.** The `GET /v1/{workspace_id}/audit` endpoint continues to work as before, always scoped to the specified workspace.

**What you need to do:**

* **Handle nullable `workspace_id` in audit event responses.** If your integration parses audit event responses, update your models to accept a null `workspace_id` field. This applies only to events returned by the platform-wide endpoint. Workspace-scoped reads always include a workspace.
* **Use `/v1/audit-log/me` for self-service audit trails.** Callers who need their own cross-workspace activity history can use this endpoint without workspace-level audit permissions.
* **Use `/v1/audit-log/platform` for administrative audit review.** Platform administrators with the `platform:admin` scope can query the full audit trail, including pre-workspace events.

</details>

<details>

<summary>Platform API: Enterprise SSO, SAML/OIDC Federation, and MFA Retired (July 2026)</summary>

#### Enterprise SSO, SAML/OIDC Federation, and MFA Retired <a href="#enterprise-sso-saml-oidc-federation-and-mfa-retired" id="enterprise-sso-saml-oidc-federation-and-mfa-retired"></a>

The enterprise SSO federation and multi-factor authentication feature cluster has been removed from the identity service. These capabilities were never generally available and carried zero active configurations.

**What changed:**

* **Federation source endpoints removed.** The `GET/POST /admin/federation-sources`, `GET/PUT/DELETE /admin/federation-sources/{source_id}` endpoints are no longer available. Calls to these endpoints return a 404 response.
* **SSO connection endpoints removed.** The `GET/POST /admin/sso-connections`, `GET/PUT/DELETE /admin/sso-connections/{connection_id}` endpoints are no longer available.
* **MFA endpoints removed.** The `POST /mfa/enroll`, `POST /mfa/verify`, `POST /mfa/challenge`, `GET /mfa/status`, `DELETE /mfa/unenroll` user endpoints and the `GET /admin/mfa/coverage`, `POST /admin/mfa/reset/{entity_id}` admin endpoints are no longer available.
* **OIDC federation flow removed.** The `GET /federation/oidc/authorize` and `POST /federation/oidc/callback` endpoints are no longer available.
* **SAML federation flow removed.** The `GET /federation/saml/metadata/{source_id}`, `GET /federation/saml/login`, and `POST /federation/saml/acs` endpoints are no longer available.
* **MFA coverage removed from compliance posture.** MFA enrollment statistics are no longer included in compliance or coverage responses.

**What you need to do:**

* **Remove references to federation, SSO, and MFA endpoints.** If your automation or admin tooling calls any of the removed endpoints, remove those calls.
* **Review authentication strategy.** These features were unused. If your security planning assumed future availability of platform-native SAML/OIDC federation or TOTP MFA, contact your account team to discuss alternatives.

</details>

<details>

<summary>Platform API: Per-Workspace IP Allowlist Removed (July 2026)</summary>

#### Per-Workspace IP Allowlist Removed <a href="#per-workspace-ip-allowlist-removed" id="per-workspace-ip-allowlist-removed"></a>

The per-workspace IP allowlist feature has been removed from the identity service. Workspaces that had allowlist entries configured are no longer enforcing IP-based access restrictions through this mechanism.

**What changed:**

* **Admin IP allowlist endpoints removed.** The `GET /admin/ip-allowlists`, `POST /admin/ip-allowlists`, `DELETE /admin/ip-allowlists/{id}`, and `POST /admin/ip-allowlists/test` endpoints are no longer available. Calls to these endpoints return a 404 response.
* **IP allowlist enforcement removed from token issuance.** Token grants (API key, client credentials, personal access token, email OTP, magic link, Google OAuth, and device code) no longer check the caller's IP address against a workspace allowlist. All previously blocked IPs are now permitted.
* **Compliance posture field removed.** The `ip_allowlist_active` field is no longer included in the compliance posture response. Integrations that read this field should remove references to it.

**What you need to do:**

* **Remove references to the IP allowlist endpoints.** If your automation or admin tooling calls any of the removed endpoints, remove those calls.
* **Update compliance dashboards.** If your compliance reporting reads the `ip_allowlist_active` field from the compliance posture response, remove that reference. The field is no longer returned.
* **Review network-level access controls.** If your security posture relied on the per-workspace IP allowlist, migrate to network-level controls (firewall rules, VPN, or reverse-proxy restrictions) to achieve equivalent protection.

</details>

<details>

<summary>Platform API: Per-Workspace Conversation Topic Analytics Controls (July 2026)</summary>

#### Per-Workspace Conversation Topic Analytics Controls <a href="#per-workspace-conversation-topic-analytics-controls" id="per-workspace-conversation-topic-analytics-controls"></a>

Workspace administrators can now control whether customer-facing conversation topic analytics are exposed through each workspace's data scope.

**What changed:**

* **New settings endpoints.** `GET /v1/{workspace_id}/settings/topic-modeling` returns the current exposure state. `PUT /v1/{workspace_id}/settings/topic-modeling` sets the desired state and queues an idempotent reconciliation of the workspace's data scope.
* **Fail-closed exposure model.** Conversation topic analytics are not exposed unless explicitly enabled for a workspace. If the desired state cannot be determined during reconciliation, topic analytics are withdrawn rather than retained.
* **Amigo-administrator-only access.** Both endpoints require workspace update permission and an authenticated Amigo administrator identity. Non-administrator callers receive a 403 response.
* **Reconciliation on archive.** Archiving a workspace now queues a data-scope reconciliation to ensure that sensitive feature views are withdrawn promptly, rather than waiting for the next scheduled safety-net run.
* **Protected setting mutation.** The topic analytics exposure flag is isolated from general workspace settings updates. Unrelated settings changes cannot overwrite or reset the flag.

**What you need to do:**

* **No action required for existing workspaces.** Topic analytics remain disabled until an Amigo administrator explicitly enables them.
* **Use the new endpoints to manage exposure.** To enable or disable conversation topic analytics for a workspace, call `PUT /v1/{workspace_id}/settings/topic-modeling` with `{"enabled": true}` or `{"enabled": false}`.

</details>

<details>

<summary>Platform API: Per-Turn Authorization for Durable Text Sessions (July 2026)</summary>

#### Per-Turn Authorization for Durable Text Sessions <a href="#per-turn-authorization-for-durable-text-sessions" id="per-turn-authorization-for-durable-text-sessions"></a>

Text conversations that use the durable session path now carry the caller's verified authorization context with each individual turn, rather than fixing it once at session start.

**What changed:**

* **Per-turn authorization propagation.** Each user message enqueued to a durable text session now includes the authorization context verified at request time. The session applies that context before running the turn's reasoning and tool calls, so successive turns from different callers (or the same caller with changed grants) each operate under the correct scope.
* **Authorization-bound tools execute inline.** Tools with server-bound parameters are always resolved within the turn that carries their authorization context. They are never deferred to a background worker, ensuring the bound values cannot be read by a later turn with a different scope.
* **Conversation-level authorization check.** When a request names an existing conversation, the platform now verifies that the authorization context's conversation identifier matches. A mismatch returns a 403 response. Requests that create a new conversation (no conversation identifier supplied) are not affected.
* **Fail-closed on missing or corrupt context.** If a turn arrives without an authorization context, or with a context that cannot be validated, server-bound tool calls are denied rather than falling back to a previous turn's scope.

**What you need to do:**

* **No action required for most integrations.** The per-turn authorization model is transparent to callers. Requests that already supply a valid authorization block continue to work.
* **Review integrations that reuse a single authorization block across conversations.** If your integration stamps the same authorization block onto turns for different conversations, the new conversation-level check may return 403. Ensure each turn's authorization block matches the conversation it targets.

</details>

<details>

<summary>Platform API: Authorization-Scoped Parameter Execution for SQL Tools (July 2026)</summary>

#### Authorization-Scoped Parameter Execution for SQL Tools <a href="#authorization-scoped-parameter-execution-for-sql-tools" id="authorization-scoped-parameter-execution-for-sql-tools"></a>

Platform functions and workspace data queries that declare server-bound parameters now inject scoping values at execution time from the conversation turn's authorization context.

**What changed:**

* **Server-bound parameter injection.** SQL and AI platform functions, and workspace data queries, can now declare parameters that are bound to the external principal's authorization grants. At execution time the platform resolves the principal's resource-level access and injects the appropriate scoping value into the query. The agent and caller never see or supply the bound parameter - it is omitted from the tool's input schema.
* **Fail-closed execution.** If the authorization context is unavailable (direct API invocation, Developer Console test panel, or MCP tool call), execution is denied with a 403 response rather than falling back to a caller-supplied or default value.
* **Direct and MCP invocation denied for bound tools.** The platform function invoke endpoint and the workspace data query invoke endpoint both return 403 when the target carries a server-bound parameter. MCP tool registration surfaces an error envelope for the same reason.
* **In-process execution enforced.** Tools with server-bound parameters are never dispatched to background workers. They always execute in the same process as the live conversation turn.

**What you need to do:**

* **No action required for existing tools.** Tools without server-bound parameters are unaffected. The new behavior applies only to tools authored with an authorization binding on one or more parameters.
* **Update integrations that invoke bound tools directly.** If you call a platform function or workspace data query that carries a server-bound parameter through the REST API or MCP, expect a 403 response. These tools are callable only during an authenticated conversation turn.

</details>

<details>

<summary>Platform API: Access Token Lifetime Restored to 15 Minutes (July 2026)</summary>

#### Access Token Lifetime Restored to 15 Minutes <a href="#access-token-lifetime-restored-to-15-minutes" id="access-token-lifetime-restored-to-15-minutes"></a>

The default access-token lifetime has been restored to 15 minutes, down from the temporary 24-hour value.

**What changed:**

* **Shorter access-token TTL.** Access tokens issued by the identity service now expire after 15 minutes by default, matching the original lifetime. The previous 24-hour lifetime has been reverted. Operator access tokens remain at 4 hours.
* **Tighter idle-session enforcement.** Because idle-timeout checks run on token refresh, the shorter TTL ensures that idle principals are re-evaluated more frequently rather than deferring the check for up to a full day.

**What you need to do:**

* **Verify token-refresh logic.** If your integration caches access tokens or refreshes them on a fixed schedule, confirm that it handles the 15-minute expiry window. Integrations that already use standard refresh-on-expiry flows require no changes.
* **Expect more frequent refresh requests.** Clients will refresh tokens more often under the restored TTL. This is expected behavior and does not indicate an error.

</details>

<details>

<summary>Platform API: Async Audit Export with Presigned Download Links (July 2026)</summary>

#### Async Audit Export with Presigned Download Links <a href="#async-audit-export-with-presigned-download-links" id="async-audit-export-with-presigned-download-links"></a>

Audit event exports now run asynchronously and return short-lived presigned download links instead of requiring a proxy download through the platform.

**What changed:**

* **Async export submission.** `POST /audit/export` now submits the export query asynchronously and returns a `statement_id` handle with a `status` of `pending` or `ready`. The response no longer contains an inline download URL or row count - poll for results instead.
* **Presigned result polling.** A new `GET /audit/export/{statement_id}` endpoint lets you poll the export status. When `status` is `ready`, the response includes `chunks`. Each chunk carries a short-lived presigned URL (`external_link`) that you download directly from object storage. Links expire quickly (roughly 15 minutes). Re-poll the endpoint to get fresh links.
* **CSV result format.** Export results are now delivered as CSV files via the presigned links, replacing the previous NDJSON proxy-download format.
* **No row limit on exports.** Compliance exports no longer enforce a maximum row count. The full date range is exported without silent truncation.
* **Removed endpoints.** The `GET /audit/exports` (list past exports) and `GET /audit/exports/download/{filename}` (proxy-download) endpoints have been removed. All export retrieval now goes through the poll-based presigned link flow.
* **Simplified response models.** The `AuditExportResponse`, `AuditExportListItem`, and `AuditExportListResponse` models are replaced by `AuditExportSubmitResponse` and `AuditExportResultResponse`.

**What you need to do:**

* **Update export integrations.** Replace calls to `POST /audit/export` that expect a synchronous download URL. Instead, capture the `statement_id` from the submit response, poll `GET /audit/export/{statement_id}` until `status` is `ready`, then download from the presigned URLs in `chunks`.
* **Remove references to deleted endpoints.** If your integration lists or downloads exports via `/audit/exports` or `/audit/exports/download/{filename}`, migrate to the new poll-based flow.
* **Handle link expiration.** Presigned download links are short-lived. Download promptly after polling, or re-poll for fresh links if they expire.

</details>

<details>

<summary>Platform API: Per-Workspace Intake Deduplication Override (July 2026)</summary>

#### Per-Workspace Intake Deduplication Override <a href="#per-workspace-intake-deduplication-override" id="per-workspace-intake-deduplication-override"></a>

Workspaces can now temporarily bypass content-hash deduplication during intake re-syncs, allowing newly added catalog columns to be backfilled.

**What changed:**

* **Per-workspace dedup override flag.** A new `intake-dedup-disabled` feature flag lets a workspace opt out of content-hash deduplication on file intake. When the flag is enabled for a workspace, an unchanged re-sync re-lands every file as a new version instead of short-circuiting to the existing catalog entry.
* **Backfill escape hatch.** The override exists to support backfilling catalog columns that were introduced after the original ingest - such as source-provenance fields whose values only populate on a fresh version. Without the override, byte-identical files would deduplicate and skip version creation.
* **Fails closed to dedup-on.** If the flag provider is unreachable or the flag is not configured, deduplication remains enabled. The default idempotent upload behavior is never lost by accident.
* **Intended for temporary use.** Enable the flag for a single workspace, re-sync the affected sources, then disable it. The flag is not designed for permanent use.

**What you need to do:**

* **No action required for most integrations.** Default deduplication behavior is unchanged. Uploads continue to be idempotent unless the flag is explicitly enabled.
* **Contact your Amigo team to enable the flag.** If you need to backfill catalog columns on previously ingested files, request that the `intake-dedup-disabled` flag be enabled for your workspace, run your re-sync, and then request that it be disabled.

</details>

<details>

<summary>Platform API: Source Provenance on Batch Document Intake (July 2026)</summary>

#### Source Provenance on Batch Document Intake <a href="#source-provenance-on-batch-document-intake" id="source-provenance-on-batch-document-intake"></a>

The batch document intake path now carries the same source provenance metadata as the single-file intake path, ensuring consistent lineage in the analytical catalog.

**What changed:**

* **Source identifiers on every batch file entry.** Each file in a batch processing manifest now includes a source file id and source URL. These opaque identifiers always populate, matching the single-file intake behavior.
* **PHI-gated human-readable fields.** The source folder path and original filename are included in the manifest only when the target dataset has been attested as PHI-free. For datasets that contain PHI, these fields remain absent so that protected information does not leave the durable intake record.
* **Consistent provenance across intake paths.** Downstream catalog rows now receive the same source lineage fields regardless of whether a document was ingested individually or as part of a batch. Previously, batch-ingested documents did not carry source provenance.

**What you need to do:**

* **No action required for most integrations.** The new fields are optional and additive. Existing batch intake workflows continue to work without changes.
* **Consume source provenance if needed.** If your integration reads batch manifests and needs to correlate documents back to their original source location, the new source file id and source URL fields are now available on every file entry. The folder path and filename are available only for PHI-free datasets.

</details>

<details>

<summary>Platform API: FHIR Patient Bundle Builder Endpoint (July 2026)</summary>

#### FHIR Patient Bundle Builder Endpoint <a href="#fhir-patient-bundle-builder-endpoint" id="fhir-patient-bundle-builder-endpoint"></a>

A new endpoint lets integrators convert a flat list of user records into a FHIR Patient Bundle without hand-authoring FHIR resources.

**What changed:**

* **New `POST /fhir/build-bundle` endpoint.** Accepts a list of user records - each with an optional external id, email, and name fields - and returns a FHIR `collection` Bundle containing one Patient resource per user. The returned `bundle` value is the exact shape that `POST /fhir/import` expects under its `bundle` field.
* **Pure transformation, no side effects.** The endpoint does not create entities or events. It builds the bundle and returns it. Import is a separate step.
* **Deterministic, idempotent resource ids.** Each Patient receives a stable, spec-valid FHIR resource id derived from the external id (used verbatim when it satisfies the FHIR id grammar) or from a deterministic derivation when the external id is absent or non-conformant. Re-calling the endpoint with the same input produces the same ids, so a later import upserts rather than duplicates.
* **MR identifier for canonical id resolution.** Every Patient includes an MR-type identifier. When the external id is present, it becomes the identifier value (preserving the source-system binding). Otherwise, the derived resource id is used. Raw email addresses are never placed into the identifier value.
* **Name and contact mapping.** A full name or first/last name parts are mapped to an official FHIR HumanName. Email addresses are mapped to an email telecom entry.
* **Up to 1,000 users per request.** The `users` list accepts between 1 and 1,000 entries. Each user must supply at least one of external id or email.

**What you need to do:**

* **Use this endpoint to simplify FHIR onboarding.** Instead of manually constructing Patient resources, pass your user list to `POST /fhir/build-bundle` and then send the returned bundle to `POST /fhir/import`.
* **Supply external ids when available.** External ids (such as your system's user identifiers) produce the most stable canonical id binding on import. Email-only users still work but use a derived identifier.

</details>

<details>

<summary>Platform API: Default Access-Token Lifetime Extended to 24 Hours (July 2026)</summary>

#### Default Access-Token Lifetime Extended to 24 Hours <a href="#default-access-token-lifetime-extended-to-24-hours" id="default-access-token-lifetime-extended-to-24-hours"></a>

The default lifetime for access tokens issued by the identity service has been raised from 15 minutes to 24 hours. Operator access tokens remain at 4 hours.

**What changed:**

* **Default access-token TTL is now 24 hours.** Access tokens issued through standard authentication flows now default to a 24-hour lifetime instead of the previous 15-minute lifetime. This reduces the frequency of token refreshes for most integrations.
* **Operator access-token TTL unchanged at 4 hours.** Tokens issued for operator sessions remain capped at 4 hours. Operators hold live patient-data views through passive monitoring sessions, so a shorter credential window limits exposure if a token is compromised.
* **Agent session TTL unchanged.** Agent session tokens continue to use a 1-hour lifetime.
* **Idle-timeout enforcement on refresh.** The platform's idle-timeout check runs when a refresh-token grant is evaluated. With a longer access-token lifetime, an idle principal's session may persist up to 24 hours before the idle-timeout check fires on the next refresh. Organizations with strict idle-session requirements should review their refresh-token and session-management policies.

**What you need to do:**

* **No action required for most integrations.** Existing authentication flows benefit from fewer token-refresh cycles. Tokens that were previously refreshed every 15 minutes now remain valid for up to 24 hours.
* **Review token storage and revocation practices.** A longer-lived token increases the window during which a leaked credential is usable. Ensure your integration stores access tokens securely and revokes them when they are no longer needed.
* **Evaluate idle-session policies.** If your organization enforces HIPAA idle-timeout requirements, confirm that your refresh-token grant interval and session-management configuration align with the new 24-hour access-token window.

</details>

<details>

<summary>Platform API: Authorization-Bound Parameter Schema Hiding (July 2026)</summary>

#### Authorization-Bound Parameter Schema Hiding <a href="#authorization-bound-parameter-schema-hiding" id="authorization-bound-parameter-schema-hiding"></a>

Server-bound parameters are now hidden from every caller-facing schema, completing the caller-side enforcement for authorization bindings on platform functions and workspace data queries.

**What changed:**

* **Bound parameters excluded from all caller-facing schemas.** Parameters that carry an `authorization_binding` are now automatically removed from the JSON Schema returned by read endpoints, the MCP tool schema, and the `required` list. Models and callers never see or attempt to supply a server-bound parameter.
* **Consistent hiding across all schema paths.** The exclusion applies uniformly to the schema derived during function registration, the schema returned by the platform API read path, the schema used by the agent engine for tool descriptions, and the MCP server schema for workspace data queries.
* **Example validation against bound parameters.** A function definition is rejected at authoring time if any example's input names a server-bound parameter. Because the caller-facing schema hides that parameter, an example that supplies it would be inconsistent with what the caller actually sees.
* **Bound parameter values remain injected at runtime.** The parameter continues to exist in the authored definition and as a SQL bind variable. Only the caller-facing projection is affected.

</details>

<details>

<summary>Platform API: Authorization-Bound Parameters for Platform Functions and Workspace Data Queries (July 2026)</summary>

#### Authorization-Bound Parameters for Platform Functions and Workspace Data Queries <a href="#authorization-bound-parameters-for-platform-functions-and-workspace-data-queries" id="authorization-bound-parameters-for-platform-functions-and-workspace-data-queries"></a>

Platform function parameters and workspace data query parameters can now declare an authorization binding that ties them to the calling turn's resolved external authorization context. This lays the data-model and authoring groundwork for server-injected, tamper-proof parameter values.

**What changed:**

* **New `authorization_binding` field on function parameters.** When creating or updating a platform function, each parameter in the `parameters` array can now include an optional `authorization_binding` object. When set, the parameter becomes server-bound: at execution time the platform will inject the value from the turn's authorization context rather than accepting it from the caller or model.
* **New `authorization_binding` field on workspace data query parameters.** The same binding field is available on workspace data query parameters (create and update endpoints), with identical semantics.
* **Mutual exclusion with `default`.** A parameter that declares an `authorization_binding` cannot also declare a `default` value. The API rejects requests that set both.
* **Deployment gated until execution support lands.** Deploying a function or workspace data query that includes a bound parameter is currently rejected with a validation error. This prevents a bound parameter from silently falling back to caller-supplied behavior before the execution path is ready to enforce it.
* **`kb_scope` role grant validation.** Role grants with resource type `kb_scope` now enforce that `param_binding` is not set (the grant is unconditional) and that `resource_key` contains only lowercase letters, digits, and underscores (`[a-z0-9_]+`).
* **Bound parameters hidden from caller schemas.** Server-bound parameters are excluded from every emitted caller-facing schema, so models and callers cannot attempt to supply them.

**Authorization binding object shape:**

| Field           | Type   | Description                                               |
| --------------- | ------ | --------------------------------------------------------- |
| `source`        | string | The binding source. Currently `role_grant_resource_keys`. |
| `resource_type` | string | The resource type to project. Currently `kb_scope`.       |
| `access`        | string | The access level. Defaults to `read`.                     |
| `encoding`      | string | How the projected keys are encoded. Defaults to `csv`.    |

**What you need to do:**

* **No action required for existing functions or queries.** The new field defaults to `null`, so all existing resources are unchanged.
* **Prepare for server-bound parameters.** If you plan to use authorization-scoped data access, you can begin defining parameters with authorization bindings. Note that deployment is gated until execution-time injection is available in a subsequent release.
* **Update `kb_scope` grant creation.** If you create `kb_scope` role grants, ensure `resource_key` uses only lowercase letters, digits, and underscores, and do not set `param_binding`.

</details>

<details>

<summary>Platform API: Receipt-Backed Background Polling and Delivery Acknowledgement (July 2026)</summary>

#### Receipt-Backed Background Polling and Delivery Acknowledgement <a href="#receipt-backed-background-polling-and-delivery-acknowledgement" id="receipt-backed-background-polling-and-delivery-acknowledgement"></a>

Text conversations now support a receipt-backed protocol for collecting background answers. When a tool crosses the server's blocking window, the platform hands it to a background task and signals the client. Clients poll for the completed answer, receive a delivery receipt, render the result, and then acknowledge the receipt so the platform knows the answer was consumed.

**What changed:**

* **Delivery protocol version 2.** Turn responses include a `delivery_protocol_version` field (value `2` when the serving agent supports the receipt protocol). Clients should begin polling only after observing version 2.
* **Receipt-backed poll responses.** A `poll=true` turn that claims a ready background answer now returns a `delivery` object containing `delivery_id`, `request_id`, and `receipt`. The receipt is opaque and required for acknowledgement.
* **New acknowledgement endpoint.** `POST /{workspace_id}/conversations/{conversation_id}/turns/{delivery_id}/ack` confirms that the client rendered or durably persisted the delivered answer. The request body carries `request_id` and `receipt`. Returns 204 on success.
* **Idempotency-Key header.** `POST .../turns` and `POST .../turns/stream` accept an optional `Idempotency-Key` header (UUID) for client-controlled replay of the same logical send or poll after an ambiguous failure.
* **Poll validation tightened.** `poll=true` now rejects any user content (message text, structured content, media URL, or media type), not only a non-empty message string. The error message reflects the broader check.
* **Streaming does not support poll.** `POST .../turns/stream` with `poll=true` is rejected (422).
* **Conversation close notifies the agent.** `DELETE /{workspace_id}/conversations/{conversation_id}` now signals the serving agent before marking the conversation closed, ensuring in-flight background work is cleaned up. A narrow database conflict during close returns 409 instead of 404.
* **Independent rate-limit budgets.** Polls and acknowledgements each have their own per-conversation rate-limit budget (30 requests per minute per conversation), separate from the turn-send budget.
* **Background delivery turn identity.** A background delivery returned by a poll keeps the originating exchange identity even when later user turns already exist, so feedback and artifacts anchor to the correct exchange.

**What you need to do:**

* **Adopt the receipt-based delivery loop.** When a turn response has `background_pending=true` and `delivery_protocol_version=2`, poll with `poll=true` at moderate intervals (no more than once every few seconds). When the poll returns a `delivery` object, render the answer, then call the acknowledgement endpoint with the delivery receipt. Repeat polling until `background_pending` clears or the poll returns idle.
* **Pass the Idempotency-Key header for replay safety.** When retrying a turn send or poll after a network timeout, reuse the same UUID so the platform can deduplicate.
* **Update poll validation expectations.** If your integration previously sent media or structured content alongside `poll=true`, remove that content. The platform now rejects it.
* **Handle 409 on conversation close.** If a close request returns 409, retry the close.

</details>

<details>

<summary>Platform: Connector Sync-Run Telemetry Routing Change (July 2026)</summary>

#### Connector Sync-Run Telemetry Routing Change <a href="#connector-sync-run-telemetry-routing-change" id="connector-sync-run-telemetry-routing-change"></a>

Successful connector sync-run completion events are no longer written to the durable event store. They are recorded to operational metrics and logs only.

**What changed:**

* **Success heartbeats removed from durable events.** The per-poll `connector.sync_run.completed` event - a heartbeat that fires every polling interval whether or not new data was ingested - is no longer emitted through the durable event pipeline. At fleet scale, these heartbeats dominated per-workspace event counts (a single connector could produce thousands of rows per day), inflating analytics for otherwise idle tenants.
* **Failures remain durable.** `connector.sync_run.failed` events continue to be written as durable records with classification and error-code metadata, in addition to operational metrics. These are low-volume and diagnostically valuable.
* **Analytics and projections exclude operational exhaust.** Per-workspace event counts and entity projections now filter out operational connector exhaust, so connector polling volume no longer distorts workspace activity summaries or drives unnecessary compute.
* **Operational metrics coverage.** Every sync run (success and failure) is recorded to operational metrics with bounded-cardinality tags, including record counts and duration. Monitoring dashboards that rely on these metrics are unaffected.

**What you need to do:**

* **No action required for most integrations.** If your integration consumes connector events from the durable event store, successful sync-run completions are no longer present. Failure events are unchanged.
* **Use operational metrics for sync-run monitoring.** If you previously counted durable sync-run events to monitor connector health, use the operational metrics surface instead.

</details>

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