Runtime Safety
Current runtime safety controls, their enforcement boundaries, operator intervention, and evidence-based release practices.
Runtime safety is a layered system. Authored conversation policy guides the agent, structural controls constrain supported execution paths, server-side authorization limits writes, and operators can intervene through the unified Runs surface.
The current architecture does not depend on a separate semantic monitoring or regulatory-triage service. Safety-critical behavior must be expressed in the agent's context graph, tool permissions, escalation instructions, and operating procedures, then verified against representative scenarios.
Control Map
Context graph policy
Voice and text
States define objectives, available tools, exit conditions, guardrails, and boundary constraints that shape agent behavior.
Graph navigation invariants
Platform-managed context graph runtime
Navigation resolves to an engageable state, detects loops, and caps per-turn transitions in code.
Cross-runtime invariant observation
Voice
The platform records shadow verdicts for engageable-state, loop, and iteration checks. These verdicts do not change the live call.
Response guardrail observation
Voice
Candidate responses are compared with the active state's guardrails and boundary constraints in shadow mode. Verdicts are diagnostic only.
Integration approval policy
Text conversations
A top-level integration tool call can pause for an authorized approve or reject decision when its integration policy gates the operation.
Write scope
Supported agent write tools
A server-side write scope binds model-originated writes to an allowed workspace and entity; each registered tool constrains its resource shape and source-appropriate confidence.
In-flight write deduplication
Supported voice runtimes
An identical write-tool call is short-circuited while the first invocation is still running. A later invocation can proceed after the first finishes.
Caller verification
Voice and text
A caller matched by phone number or a supplied entity_id stays unverified, and the patient record stays out of the agent's context, until the stated full name and date of birth match exactly one record through world_confirm_patient_identity.
Transfer destinations
Voice
A dynamic transfer dials only a number listed in the service's approved_destinations; any other number is refused without dialing.
Crisis resource guidance
Text and platform-managed voice
The agent's instructions always carry the deployment region's crisis resource and tell it to give that resource on suicidal thoughts, self-harm, or an overdose. This is model guidance, not a deterministic check.
Spoken-reply check
Platform-managed voice
A pattern check blocks an unconfirmed booking or cancellation claim, dosing or medication-change advice, and a promise to contact emergency services, and speaks a short correction in English or Spanish. It can miss or over-match a phrasing.
Speech recognition failure
Platform-managed voice
A failed recognizer is replaced once by another that supports the caller's language. Otherwise the agent apologizes and transfers to the fixed forwarding destination, or ends the call.
Request for a person
Text and platform-managed voice
A request to speak with a person does not end the conversation. The agent is told to transfer when forward_call is available, and otherwise to say it can't connect the caller and keep helping.
Operator control
Eligible live runs
Authorized operators can listen, take over, send guidance, author a text turn, and hand control back, depending on channel.
This map distinguishes controls that actively enforce behavior from controls that only produce evidence. That distinction matters when setting clinical and operational expectations.
Safety in the Agent Policy
The agent evaluates the conversation within its normal reasoning loop. The platform-level checks in the control map cover a few narrow cases, but they do not compensate for missing escalation instructions or incomplete boundaries.
For each safety-sensitive state, define:
Objective - What the agent is trying to accomplish in that state.
Allowed tools - The smallest tool set needed for the task.
Boundary constraints - What the agent must not claim, recommend, or attempt.
Escalation conditions - Observable situations that require a human or a configured transfer target.
Safe fallback - What the agent should say and do if the required person, tool, or destination is unavailable.
Exit conditions - The evidence needed before the graph advances.
On the Platform API, reusable policy that spans states should be expressed through shared context graph structure, state guidance, transitions, eligible tools, and tested authoring conventions. Classic dynamic behavior sets are a separate Classic API capability and are not a Platform runtime control.
Structural Navigation Controls
The platform-managed context graph navigator enforces three structural properties during a turn:
Engageable landing - Routing states are resolved until the conversation reaches a state that can handle the next user interaction.
Loop handling - Repeated navigation is detected so the engine does not traverse the graph indefinitely.
Transition cap - A bounded number of state changes can occur within one turn.
If navigation cannot resolve safely, this runtime stays on the last engageable state rather than presenting a routing-only state to the caller.
The voice layer also observes these properties across supported runtimes. That observer is shadow-only: it records diagnostic verdicts but does not interrupt, reroute, or end a call. Runtimes that navigate independently therefore do not inherit the platform-managed navigator's enforcement merely because they produce the same telemetry.
Guardrail Evaluation Status
State guardrails and boundary constraints are included in the agent's active instructions. Separately, the platform runs a lightweight response-text evaluator on voice calls and records whether a candidate response appears to overlap a configured rule.
Because shadow evaluation observes text rather than clinical truth, teams should review false positives and false negatives before using its output in an operational process.
Write Safety
Integration Tool Approval
Workspace integrations can set an approval policy of none, writes, or all. On supported text conversation paths, a gated top-level integration call is parked before execution until an authorized reviewer approves or rejects it. The default is none.
This mechanism is conversation-scoped and fail-closed. It does not currently gate integration tools called from companion skills, and it does not apply to voice execution. It is also separate from external write proposals: integration approval pauses a conversation tool call, while an external proposal stages a connector payload for later review and delivery.
Agent Write Scope
Supported agent write tools receive a server-constructed write scope that restricts which workspace and entity the operation can target. The registered tool contract separately constrains the resource shape and assigns or caps the confidence available to model-originated data.
These checks protect the persistence boundary even if the model supplies an unexpected identifier. System-originated connector and projection work follows separate trusted-service authorization and is not evidence that an agent can bypass its own scope.
Duplicate Calls
Supported voice runtimes track identical write-tool calls that are already in progress. If the model repeats the same write before the first completes, the duplicate is rejected as already running. This prevents concurrent duplicates; it is not a permanent idempotency guarantee for later calls.
Operations that need durable idempotency should still use the operation's documented idempotency key or destination-specific protection.
External Delivery
Recording an observation in the world model does not confirm an external mutation. Unattended connector delivery and the review-gated external write proposal flow were retired with the connector runner on October 10, 2026, so world-model observations are not delivered to external systems by a connector. An external mutation happens through a tool the agent calls, such as an integration endpoint, and its result is the evidence of what the destination accepted.
Human Intervention
The unified Runs surface gives operators one place to monitor eligible live work:
Voice - Join in listen mode, explicitly take over, send guidance, switch mode, and hand the call back.
Text channels - Pause an eligible run, author the next turn, and hand control back.
History - Inspect the transcript, run metadata, available analysis, and recorded operator actions.
Operator actions require the Operator update permission, available to operator, admin, and owner roles. Supported action routes bind the requested operator identity to the authenticated caller and emit operator-attributed events for takeover-related actions.
An authored escalation policy must also define what happens when no operator is available. Appropriate fallbacks can include a configured transfer target, callback workflow, emergency instruction, or a bounded refusal. Do not assume the platform automatically pages a clinician or creates a post-call review item.
Validation Before Release
Simulations exercise the current workspace configuration through the real reasoning and tool path. Simulation-originated world-model writes are tagged so production EHR delivery and production analytics can exclude them, but simulations do not create an isolated configuration branch and do not replace every external dependency with a stub.
Use dedicated test workspaces, test entities, or safe integration environments when a scenario could reach a real external system. Separate broad text-tier validation from real-audio tests that measure transcription, speech rendering, turn timing, and media attachment.
A practical release review includes:
Run targeted cases for each safety boundary and escalation path.
Run regression suites against the configuration intended for release.
Inspect normalized checks, transcripts, tool calls, and failure reasons.
Review shadow guardrail and control-invariant evidence where available.
Confirm operator staffing and fallback procedures.
Deliberately update the pinned
releaseversion set when the evidence is acceptable.
Simulation results and drift analysis do not automatically block version-set promotion or roll back a release. Promotion and rollback are deliberate operator actions.
Production Review
After release, use conversation evaluations, run history, connector outcomes, and operational metrics to find changes in behavior. Compare defined cohorts and stable time windows rather than treating a single aggregate score as proof of safety.
When a regression appears:
Identify affected channels, services, versions, and cohorts.
Add or update a reproducible simulation case.
Verify whether the issue is agent behavior, tool behavior, media quality, or destination failure.
Correct the smallest responsible configuration or integration boundary.
Re-run the affected suite before moving the release pin.
What Runtime Safety Does Not Guarantee
Perfect outcomes - Model behavior and external systems remain fallible.
Automatic clinical triage - The crisis resource and spoken-reply checks cover narrow cases. Organizations must author, test, and staff their own clinical escalation protocols.
Enforced shadow verdicts - Guardrail and cross-runtime invariant observers currently record evidence only.
Universal human review - Only supported top-level text integration calls use an approval path. The external write proposal flow was retired with the connector runner.
Automatic deployment rollback - Teams decide when to move a version-set pin.
Automatic outbound reconciliation - Unattended connector delivery is retired; verify each integration call's result at the destination.
Related Documentation
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